We’ve never been shy about beating the 23095 - 1916-18 German Medic Carrying Wounded Soldier - W. Britain drum at Code42, but the buzz on insider threat is reaching fever pitch. Small to medium-sized enterprise security and IT teams know they need to address this looming risk. But the biggest hurdle is answering the question, “Where do we start?”
For the past few years, the prevailing answer has been, “BUILD A COMPREHENSIVE INSIDER THREAT PROGRAM.” But let’s be honest: This is daunting. It’s time-consuming. It’s expensive. Moreover, these “best practices” often involved creating an entire team dedicated exclusively to insider threat detection and response. That sounds fantastic — but well beyond reality for most of us dealing with strained resources and limited budgets.
Most problematic: The root of this traditional approach is implementing traditional DLP. Just mentioning DLP might make you cringe as you imagine expensive technology and super complex rules that, at the end of the day, often do more harm than good — frustrating users with barriers to productivity and leading to workarounds and exceptions that compromise the whole program.
You need something simpler. We all do, because the insider threat problem is not going away.
“ Start by focusing on the most common data exfiltration scenarios. These center on a few common use cases that impact nearly every organization — departing employees and high-risk workers, accidental leakage and organizational changes (re-organization, M&A, divestiture, etc.). ”
Here at Code42, we’ve come up with a better approach to building an insider threat program — and it all centers on a simple starting point: the everyday triggers that create your biggest insider threat risks. These are common use cases that happen every day (or every hour) that account for the vast majority of insider threat incidents — departing employees, accidental leakage and organizational changes. Hone-in on these high-risk triggers, and make sure you have the right technologies in place to see the full picture — not just a trail of breadcrumbs after the fact.
With these everyday use case triggers as the foundation, here are 10 critical steps that make it faster, easier and more cost-effective for small to medium-sized enterprises:
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1. Get executive buy-in: Don’t fight this battle on your own. Getting definitive buy-in from leadership is the first and most critical step in defining your security and IT team (and your efforts) as value-adding business partners — instead of frustrating data police.
2. Identify and engage your stakeholders: Continue the buy-in campaign from the top down. Think about which individuals or teams within your organization stand to lose the most from insider data theft or leakage. Identify and engage line-of-business leaders, HR, legal and other IT leaders as key stakeholders in your insider threat program.
3. Know what data is most valuable: Once you know who you’re protecting, engage those line-of-business stakeholders in conversations about what data is most valuable to them. All data has value, but these conversations are essential to understanding the different types of unstructured data to keep a close eye on — and which types of high-value unstructured data will require more creative means of tracking.
4. Think like an insider: With your valuable data in mind, put yourself in the shoes of an insider. Why would they want to move or take information — and what would they ultimately want to do with it? What tactics or blind spots might they exploit to do it? What workarounds could they use to get work done? We call these actions inside indicators of compromise.
Up to this point, the steps may look very similar to more traditional approaches. You’re figuring out what data you’re protecting — and the indicators or compromise that point to insider incidents. Now, here’s where things get simpler:CONRAD 2104 TEREX DEMAG AC 100 4 SALLER (D) + LOGO CONRAD MINT IN BOXPocher 1 8 Kotflügel Türen Mercedes Benz 540K Cabrio Spezial 1936 K 82 82-43 i5
5. Define insider triggers: Instead of building a monster program with classification schemes and policies that attempt to monitor every potential scenario (and ultimately fail), start by focusing on the most common data exfiltration scenarios. These center on a few common use cases that impact nearly every organization — departing employees and high-risk workers, accidental leakage and organizational changes (re-organization, M&A, divestiture, etc.). These use cases make up the vast majority of insider threat incidents, and serve as the foundational triggers of your insider threat program.
6. Establish consistent workflows: Investigating suspected data exfiltration can be daunting in itself. Once again, start small by focusing on the key use cases. For example, when an employee departure is triggered, define which activities will be examined — and what activities will trigger in-depth investigation. Exceptions and workarounds are the Achilles heel of insider threat programs. Make sure you clearly define the workflow for each trigger — and consistently execute and improve the steps you establish.Red Bull Rb9 Sebastian Vettel Winner German Gp World Champion F1 2013 1 43 ModelChevrolet Cruze rd R2 Marrakech Wtcc 2014 H. Valente 1 43 Model S2458
7. Create rules of engagement: Once a workflow has been triggered and potential data exfiltration identified, it should be the key stakeholder’s responsibility to directly engage the employee/actor. For example, departing employee and accidental leakage incidents will likely trigger engagement from HR and the line-of-business manager. A M&A workflow might trigger engagement from internal legal staff — or even a CFO. It’s important that these rules of engagement separate security and IT from any enforcement responsibilities. This allows them to focus on monitoring, detection and remediation — and prevents security and IT from developing an adversarial “data police” relationship with staff.
8. Leverage existing security and IT teams — and train your stakeholders: It doesn’t make sense for most small and medium-sized enterprises to create a fully dedicated insider threat team. Because we’ve honed the insider threat program down to a few key workflows, your existing security and IT teams should be able to handle the monitoring and detection responsibilities. But security and IT teams — who are already wearing multiple hats and managing strained resources — don’t have to shoulder the full burden. It’s also critical that all stakeholders (the HR, legal, line-of-business managers, etc.) be trained so they understand the full scope of the insider threat program: what is being monitored, the specific use case triggers, the investigation workflows, the rules of engagement and the tools used to accomplish all of this. This training should also clearly define their roles and responsibilities, so they’re ready to jump in when an incident response workflow is triggered.
9. Be transparent in communication: Transparency is critical for building a healthy culture that values security. Employees should know — from day one — that your organization tracks file activity. They should understand that the program is applied universally and without privileges or exceptions — and they should understand how the program is designed to support their productivity while protecting the business.Vehicule miniature Dinky toys guide Dinky toys anglais J.M Roulet EPA 19962035 MB-trac 1500 (W443) yellow Oliv 1980-1987 lim 500 , 1 32 weise Toys
10. Implement true monitoring, detection and response technology: Perhaps most important of all, your insider threat program must start long before a trigger. In other words, you can’t afford to only monitor an employee’s activity after he’s given his notice, or after rumors of organization change have begun rippling through the office. Too many insider threat monitoring solutions are limited to this post-trigger scope — and far too often, the actual exfiltration occurs much earlier. True monitoring, detection and response technology must be continuously running, providing historical context and complete visibility into all data activity. This enables your insider threat team to quickly and effectively see the full picture — and protect all data at all times.
At the end of the day, let’s stop talking about insider threat exclusively as “employees stealing stuff.” This market perception perpetuated by our industry has done more harm than good. In reality, insider threats are the actions (good, bad and indifferent) people take with data (any data) that puts customer, employee, partner or company well-being at risk. The smaller the enterprise, the greater the business risk. That’s the real promise of the workflow-based approach: It gives small and medium-sized organizations a simple starting point — just three or four use cases — that will effectively address 80% or more of your insider threat risks.